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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
JOHN VONDERHAAR HALTOM, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Case No. 20070498-L'A 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF THE CASE 
Defendant was convicted of dealing in material harmful to a minor, a till I'd ik ' i ' ivr 
felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1206 (West 2004). The conviction was 
affirmed. Sec State v. Haltom, -!U()5 1' I App 34 X. 121 l'.3d42,a^W,2007UT22,156P.3d 
792, cert, denied, 128 S M i 06 (2007). 
Defendant now appeals from an order made after judgment denying his motion lo 
reduce the degree of his conviction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-402 (West Supp. 
2007). I his (\uii1 has jurisdiciion lo determine the appeal. Sec 11 tab Code Ann. §§ 77-18a-
1(1)0) & 78-2a-3(2)(e) (West 2004). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUE AND STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
A trial court has the discretion to reduce a conviction by one degree if the court finds 
reduction is in the "interest of justice." See Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-402 [hereafter "402"]. 
In this case, defendant moved three times for a 402 reduction, once before sentencing and 
twice following the termination of his probation. All three motions were denied. Defendant 
challenges only the third denial. 
Issue: Did the trial court properly exercise its discretion in finding that a 2007 
amendment in the statutory definition of "harmful to minors" does not justify reduction of 
defendant's 2004 conviction for dealing in material harmful to a minor? 
A trial court's refusal to reduce the degree of a conviction pursuant to section 76-3-
402 is accorded great deference and reviewed only for abuse of discretion. State v. Boyd, 
2001 UT 30, H 31,25 P.3d 985 (citing State v. Woodland, 945 P.2d 665, 671 (Utah 1997)).1 
STATUTES, RULES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
Utah Code Annotated § 76-3-402(2) provides: 
Siting State v. Virgin, 2006 UT 29, 137 P.3d 787, defendant argues that only 
"some deference" is accorded a trial court's decision denying a 402 motion and that this 
Court may consider the 402 motion "de novo." See Brief of Appellant [Br.Aplt.] at 2 & 
Point I. This is incorrect. 
Virgin's "some deference" standard is limited to mixed questions of law and fact 
and, consequently, does not apply here. See State v. Graham, 2006 UT 43, f^ 16 n.7, 143 
P.3d 268 (limiting Virgin, 2006 UT 29, K 26), cert, denied, 127 S. Ct 983 (2007). In 
contrast, "great deference" is accorded a 402 decision because such decisions, like 
sentencing, "necessarily reflect the personal judgment of the [trial] court." State v. 
Albiston, 2005 UT App 425U (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). See also 
Boyd, 2001 UT 30, % 31; Woodland, 945 P.2d at 671. 
2 
(2) If the court suspends the execution of the sentence and places the defendant 
on probation, whether or not the defendant is committed to jail as a condition 
of probation, the court may enter a judgment of conviction for the next lower 
degree of offense: 
(a) after the defendant has been successfully discharged from probation; 
(b) upon motion and notice to the prosecuting attorney; 
(c) after reasonable effort has been made by the prosecuting attorney to 
provide notice to any victims; 
(d) after a hearing if requested by either party under Subsection (2)(c); 
and 
(e) if the court finds entering a judgment of conviction for the next 
lower degree of offense is in the interest of justice. 
See Addendum A for the complete text of this and any other statute cited in argument. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant Is Convicted of a Felony. In 2000, defendant was charged with dealing 
in material harmful to a minor, a third degree felony, in violation of section 76-10-1206 (R. 
2-3, 186-88). In 2003, a jury rejected defendant's claim that it was his employee's, not his 
own, fault, that the crime occurred and found him guilty (R. 416-25, 428-31; R679: 309). 
Defendant's First 402 Motion Is Denied. Before sentencing, defendant moved to 
reduce the degree of his conviction from a third degree felony to a class A misdemeanor 
pursuant to section 76-3-402(1) (R680: 1-8). See Add. A. Defendant claimed that a 
reduction was justified because he reasonably relied on his off-duty employee to check the 
minor's identification before a sexually-explicit video was sold to her and because the crime 
of dealing in material harmful to a minor should be a misdemeanor and not a felony (id.). 
Judge Dennis M. Fuchs, who presided over defendant's trial, opined that defendant's 
argument might support a mitigation in sentence, but did not justify a reduction in the degree 
3 
ofthe legislatively-proscribed offense (R6 80:11-15) (Addendum B). Nevertheless, the judge 
explained that he "made it a policy... not [to] restrict anybody from [re-]filing a 402 motion 
at the time that their probation is concluded" and encouraged defendant to do so if he wished 
(id.). Judge Fuchs then denied defendant's 402 motion (id.). 
Defendant Receives a Felony Sentence. In 20043 defendant was sentenced (R. 673; 
R681: 7-9). Judge Fuchs stated that he would consider defendant's prior arguments in 
sentencing him, but again opined that they did not justify reduction ofthe conviction: 
Let me just tell you up front, the Court did say in the course of [the 402 
hearing] arguments that were made to the Court, that there were some 
mitigating circumstances. I don't think any of those circumstances arise to the 
level, without the State's approval, of this Court reducing the conviction from 
a third-degree felony to a Class A misdemeanor. 
There are issues that the Court will take into account for purposes of 
sentencing, mitigating factors based on the facts ofthe trial that I heard, but I 
see no basis whatsoever for this Court to go against any recommendation of 
the State, or even if they're quiet, and without their approval - . . . - to reduce 
this conviction to a Class A misdemeanor. So, that-that's wherel'mcoming 
from. As far as the Court is concerned, I'm sentencing Mr. Haltom on a third-
degree felony. 
(R681: 3-4). The judge specifically addressed defendant's claim that the fault for the illegal 
sale was more his employee's than his: 
And in this particular instance, I do think that the jury had enough information 
to believe that you were extremely reckless, that your business practices might 
have been somewhat lax at the time that this occurred. And you, as the owner, 
and also you, as an individual directly involved in this sale, are responsible for 
it. And there's a penalty to pay, again, as long as you want to maintain this 
type of a business. 
And as far as I'm concerned, you know, you're welcome in the 
community to operate a business, like anybody else, as long as you do it legally 
and just follow the laws. 
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(R681: 8). The court then sentenced defendant to the statutory term of zero-to-five years 
imprisonment and ordered him to pay a $5,000.00 fine. The sentence was suspended upon 
condition that defendant serve 30 days in jail, pay $2000.00 of the fine, and successfully 
complete 36-month term of probation (R681: 9). 
Defendant appealed his conviction, but did not challenge his sentence or the denial 
of his 402 motion. The conviction was affirmed. See Haltom, 2005 UT App 348, ffif 26-27, 
affd, 2007 UT 22, *{ 9 (Addendum E). 
Defendant's Second 402 Motion Is Denied. In 2005, defendant moved for early 
termination of his "parole" and again for reduction of his conviction to a misdemeanor, 
though this time pursuant to section 76-3-402(2) (R. 686-87). See Add. A. The trial court 
informed defendant that no termination or reduction would be considered unless Adult 
Probation & Parole [AP & P] and the prosecutor agreed (R. 703). The prosecutor objected 
to both early termination and reduction of the conviction because defendant had not 
acknowledged his wrongdoing and his appeal was still pending (R. 706). A month later, after 
AP & P recommended that defendant's probation be terminated because he resided in 
Nebraska, the court terminated probation, but deferred consideration of the second 402 
motion until the appeal was resolved (R. 686, 709, 728-29). 
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The state appellate process was completed in February 2007. See Haltom, 2007 UT 
22 {Add. E). The district court then reassigned the case to Judge Randall N. Skanchy because 
Judge Fuchs had retired.2 
Defendant then filed a memorandum in support of the pending 402 motion (R. 737-
41). In it, defendant argued that the Haltom appellate decisions were not "reasonable 
interpretation^]" of the dealing in material harmful to a minor statute and "compromise[d] 
his rights to free expression under the First Amendment" (R. 739-40). He also informed the 
court that in 2000, the same year of the Utah offense, he was charged and ultimately 
convicted of illegally distributing obscene materials in Nebraska. Defendant argued that 
because the Nebraska conviction involving adults was a misdemeanor, the Utah conviction 
involving minors should be reduced to a misdemeanor (R. 774-92). 
On March 28, 2007, Judge Skanchy formally denied defendant's second 402 motion 
(R. 793-94) (Addendum Q . The court stated that it had reviewed "the nature and 
circumstances of the offense and the history and character of the defendant," together with 
the parties's memoranda and oral arguments, but found no reason to view a felony conviction 
as unduly harsh (id.). Defendant does not challenge this ruling on appeal. 
2Defendant argues that Judge Fuchs intended to grant this second 402 motion, but 
then retired. See Br.Aplt. at 15-16. To the contrary, in denying the first 402 motion and 
in sentencing defendant, Judge Fuchs opined that the felony conviction was appropriate 
and defendant must face the consequences of his illegal acts. The judge also twice voiced 
his unwillingness to reduce the legislatively-proscribed degree of the offense (R680: 11-
13;R681:7-10). 
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Defendant's Third 402 Motion Is Denied. Eight days after the second 402 motion 
was formally denied, defendant filed a third 402 motion (R. 796-97, 799-804).3 
The third 402 motion offered but one reason to reduce the conviction. In 2007, the 
Utah Legislature amended the definition of "harmful to minors" found in Utah Code Ann. 
§ 76-10-1201 (4) (West Supp. 2007). According to defendant, the amendment "repealed" the 
crime of dealing in material harmful to a minor found in section 76-10-1206(1) and justified 
reduction of his felony conviction to a misdemeanor (R. 766-97 & 799-804; R903: 1). The 
prosecutor responded that the 2007 amendment, a change in preposition, was a mistake that 
the sponsor intended to remedy in the next legislative session (R. 861-62; R903: 2-4). 
Alternatively, the prosecutor argued that under Utah law, a subsequent amendment to a 
statute does not affect on a prior judgment and, therefore, the 2007 amendment was of no 
consequence (R. 863-65; R903: 2). 
On June 12, 2007, the trial court found that the 2007 amendment did not affect the 
appropriateness of defendant's 2004 conviction and denied the third 402 motion (R. 886-88) 
{Addendum D). It this denial which defendant now challenges (R. 889). 
3Defendant characterized the motion as an "amended" second motion (R. 796-97). 
The prosecutor correctly noted, however, that because the second motion had already 
been formally denied, the new motion was a third motion that raised a new ground not 
raised in either of the prior motions (R. 860-61, 863). Though the prosecutor argued that 
the third motion was untimely, the trial court ruled on its merits (R. 863, 886-88). 
7 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The facts of defendant's crime are adequately set forth in this Court's and the supreme 
court's prior Haltom decisions. In sum, a seventeen-year-old girl, who was assisting the 
police, entered defendant's sexually-oriented business, showed defendant her real driver's 
license which contained her true birth date, and purchased a sexually-explicit video. Before 
making the sale, defendant inspected the driver's license and quizzed the minor about its 
contents. Nevertheless, defendant directed an employee to sell the video to the minor. See 
Haltom, 2005 UT App 348, ffi[ 2-5, 12 & 22-23; affd, 2007 UT 22, ffif 3-5 {Add. E). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Defendant claims that the crime he was convicted of in 2004, dealing in material 
harmful to a minor, was repealed in 2007 when the Utah Legislature changed a preposition 
in the definition of the phrase "harmful to minors." Defendant asserts that this "repeal" 
mandates reduction of his felony conviction to a class A misdemeanor. No authority supports 
defendant. 
Utah has long recognized that a subsequent amendment of a criminal statute does not 
affect a prior final criminal judgment. Consequently, even if a repeal occurred in 2007, that 
statutory change would not affect defendant's 2004 conviction. 
But a repeal did not occur. At most, the 2007 amendment to the definition of 
"harmful to minors" limits what material may now be prosecuted under the dealing in 
material harmful to a minor statute. It is more likely, however, that the change from "of to 
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"with" in the definition is simply a grammatical mistake. Indeed, the definition is slated for 
correction in the next legislative session. But regardless of whether the amendment is a 
repeal or a mistake, the change does not compel reduction of defendant's conviction in the 
interest of justice. Consequently, the trial court properly exercised its discretion in finding 
that the 2007 amendment did not justify a "different result" in defendant's 2004 conviction. 
ARGUMENT4 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY EXERCISED ITS DISCRETION IN 
FINDING THAT A 2007 STATUTORY AMENDMENT DOES NOT 
IUSTIFY REDUCTION OF DEFENDANT'S 2004 FELONY 
CONVICTION 
Defendant was convicted of dealing in material harmful to a minor in violation of 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1206 (2004). At the time of defendant's crime in 2000, his trial in 
2003, and his conviction in 2004, section 76-10-1206(1) read: 
A person is guilty of dealing in material harmful to minors when, knowing that 
a person is a minor, or having failed to exercise reasonable care in ascertaining 
the proper age of the minor, he . . . intentionally distributes . . . to a minor any 
material harmful to minors. 
See Add. A for complete text of 2004 statute. The phrase "harmful to minors" was defined 
in another statute, Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1201(4) (West 2004), which, at the time, read: 
"Harmful to minors" means that quality of any description or representation, 
in whatsoever form, of nudity, sexual conduct, sexual excitement, or 
sadomasochistic abuse when it: 
(a) taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest in sex of minors; 
4The State addressed defendant's Point I (standard of review) in footnote 1, supra 
at 2. The argument portion of this brief addresses defendant's Point II. 
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(b) is patently offensive to prevailing standards in the adult community 
as a whole with respect to what is suitable material for minors, and 
(c) taken as a whole, does not have serious value for minors. Serious 
value includes only serious literary, artistic, political or scientific value 
for minors. 
See Add. A for complete text of 2004 statute. 
At trial, defendant conceded that he knew that the video sold to the minor was 
"harmful to minors" and, therefore, its sale to a minor was legally prohibited (R674: 30-31; 
R677: 211-13, 237). He claimed, however, that he should not be held criminally liable for 
the illegal sale because he was not at fault in not ascertaining the minor's true age (R677: 
224-27, 245-46). See also Haltom, 2005 UT App 348, \ 12 (Add E). The jury rejected 
defendant's claim and convicted him of the illegal sale (R. 431; R679: 308). On appeal, this 
Court and the Utah Supreme Court interpreted the intent elements of section 76-10-1206(1) 
and held that the phrase, "having failed to exercise reasonable care in ascertaining the proper 
age of the a minor" properly required only that defendant negligently failed to ascertain the 
minor's age.5 See Haltom, 2005 UT App 348, ffif 19-20, aff'd, 2007 UT 22, ffij 6-9 (Add E). 
In 2007, the Utah Legislature amended section 76-10-1206(1) to explicitly reflect the 
negligence standard recognized in Haltom. The section now reads: 
A person is guilty of dealing in material harmful to minors when . . . having 
negligently failed to determine the proper age of a minor, the person . . . 
intentionally distributes . . . any material harmful to minors. 
5The statute also requires that defendant intentionally sell the video knowing the 
nature of its contents. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1206 (Add. A). These elements were 
never disputed. 
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(Emphasis added). See Add. A for complete text of 2007 statute. This amendment is not at 
issue here. 
At the same time, the legislature amended the definition of "harmful to minors" in 
former section 76-10-1201(4) by changing the preposition "of to "with" and making other 
stylistic changes. The definition now reads: 
"Harmful to minors" means that quality of any description or representation, 
in whatsoever form, of nudity, sexual conduct, sexual excitement, or 
sadomasochistic abuse when it: 
(I) taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest in sex with minors; 
(ii) is patently offensive to prevailing standards in the adult community 
as a whole with respect to what is suitable material for minors; and 
(iii) taken as a whole, does not have serious literary, artistic, political 
or scientific value for minors. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1201 (5)(a) (West Supp. 2007) (emphasis added) (Add A). It is this 
prepositional change which defendant claims repealed his underlying crime and justifies 
reduction of his offense. See Brief of Appellant [Br.Aplt.] at 18-20, 23-24. 
This Court need not determine the meaning of the 2007 legislative amendment, 
because whatever the current definition of "harmful to minors," any change in 2007 does not 
affect the validity or degree of defendant's 2004 conviction. 
Utah has long-recognized that a subsequent repeal of a statute does not affect a prior 
final judgment. This principle is incorporated into statute. 
The repeal of a statute does not revive a statute previously repealed, or affect 
any right which has accrued, any duty imposed, any penalty incurred, or any 
action or proceeding commenced under or by virtue of the statute repealed. 
11 
Utah Code Ann. § 68-3-5 (West 2004) (Add. A). Utah courts have consistently recognized 
that this savings clause bars modification of a prior final judgment based on a subsequent 
statutory amendment. See State v. Miller, 464 P.2d 844, 846 (Utah 1970) (holding that 
section 68-3-5 prevents modification of a final sentence based on a subsequent legislative 
change in penalty); Salina City v. Lewis, 172 P. 286, 290 (Utah 1918) (holding that a final 
criminal judgment cannot be modified by a subsequent amendment of the criminal statute); 
Pleasant Grove City v. Lindsay, 125 P. 389, 391-92 (Utah 1912) (recognizing that an 
identically-worded prior savings clause barred modification of a prior judgment based on a 
change in the law, but holding that the provision did not apply to municipal ordinances). See 
also State v. Tapp, 490 P.2d 334,394 (Utah 1971) (holding that a defendant is entitled to the 
benefit of a statutory amendment only z/the amendment is enacted prior to final judgment); 
Belt v. Turner, 483 P.2d 425, 425-26 (Utah 1971) (same); State v. Patience, 944 P.2d 
381,385-86 (Utah App. 1997) (same). 
Indeed, defendant concedes that "a favorable change in the law after sentence has 
been pronounced does not act to vacate the judgment or sentence." Br.Aplt. at 24. 
Defendant, therefore, "only asks that the equities of this situation be considered in reviewing 
his Motion to Reduce." Id. Here, the trial court considered the "equities" defendant argued, 
but then properly found that they did not justify reduction. 
As justification for his third 402 motion, defendant argued that the 2007 amendment 
to section 76-10-1201(4) repealed section 76-10-1206(1) (R. 3 97 :R903:1). The prosecutor 
12 
disagreed. The prosecutor explained that, at most, the legislature simply changed the 
definition of what constituted material "harmful to minors" (R. 861; R903: 2-4). The 
amendment to section 76-10-1201 occurred in House Bill 5 [H.B. 5], a 24-page bill which 
extensively amended various provisions in Title 76, Chapter 10, Part 12, concerning minors' 
access to pornography and other harmful materials (R. 797, 801, 862; R903: 2-4). See also 
Enrolled Copy, House Bill 5, 2007 General Session of the Utah State Legislature, 
http://www.le.state.ut.us. The intent behind H.B. 5 was to strengthen laws barring the 
dissemination of these materials to Utah youth. See Representative Paul Ray, Floor Debate 
on H.B. 5,2007 Utah Legislature, Gen. Sess. (January 16, 2007), http://www.le.state.ut.us. 
The other provisions of the bill support this intent. See H.B. 5, id. 
Admittedly, the change in section 76-10-1201 created a possible ambiguity. See Li 
v. Zhang, 2005 UT App 246, \ 8, 120 P.3d 30 (recognizing that if two "reasonable, yet 
conflicting" interpretations can be "gleaned from the plain language of a statute,"the statute 
is ambiguous), affd, 2006 UT 80, 150 P.3d 471. According to defendant, the phrase 
"appeals to the prurient interest in sex with minors" necessarily limits prosecution to 
materials depicting minors having sex, i.e., child pornography (R. 801-02). The prosecutor 
argued that defendant's interpretation would allow minors to have greater access to sexually-
explicit materials and, therefore, would be inconsistent with the purpose of H.B. 5 and the 
other provisions in Title 76, Chapter 10 (R. 861-862; R903: 2). See Sachs v. Lesser, 2007 
UT App 169, *[f 37,163 P.3d 662 (reaffirming that in interpreting a statute, the "primary goal 
13 
. . . is to give effect to the legislative intent, as evidenced by the plain language, in light of 
the purpose the statute was meant to achieve . . . [and] in harmony with other statutes in the 
same chapter and related chapters"), cert, granted, 168 P.3d 1264 (Utah 2007); Hansen v. 
Eyre, 2003 UT App 274, \ 7,74 P.3d 1182 (reaffirming that statutes that are "inpari materia. 
. . . must be construed together when they relate to the same . . . class of persons or things, 
or have the same purpose or object"), affd, 2005 UT 79,116 P.3d 290. Consequently, rather 
than a repeal, the change of preposition appeared to be a grammatical mistake, which, 
according to the prosecutor, was slated for remedy in the next legislative session (R. 861-62; 
R903:2-4).6 
But regardless of whether the amendment is a repeal or mistake, the change does not 
compel reductio of defendant's conviction in the interest of justice. The trial court heard oral 
argument and "review[ed] the [parties'] briefs and supporting authority" before ruling (R. 
866; R903: 1-4). The court then explained that it was not "persuaded that the Legislative 
revisions to the definition of material 'harmful to minors' require[d] a different result" in 
defendant's conviction and "therefore [the court was] not inclined in its discretionary powers 
to reduce the degree of the offense" (R. 886) (Add. D). In sum, the trial court did what 
6The prosecutor cited to the legislative web site list of bills, which at that time, 
apparently listed the intended bill (R. 862). A current (December 2007) check of the web 
site does not list the proposed amendment; however, not all 2008 bills are yet listed. In 
any case, as discussed supra at 11, the current or future definition of "harmful to minors" 
is not determinative of this appeal. 
14 
defendant seeks on appeal: it considered the equities defendant argued. The trial court 
simply disagreed with defendant that those "equities" justified reduction of his conviction. 
* * * 
The legislature in 2007 did not repeal the crime of dealing in material harmful to a 
minor in section 76-10-1206. At most, they narrowed the definition of "harmful" material 
in section 76-10-1201. More likely, the legislature made a grammatical mistake. In either 
case, the 2007 amendment only affects prosecutions commenced after its enactment. It 
cannot affect defendant's 2003 prosecution or his 2004 penalty. See Utah Code Ann. § 68-3-
5. Because no reduction of defendant's conviction was mandated, the trial court was free to 
exercise its discretion and deny defendant's third 402 motion. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court's order denying defendant's motion to reduce the degree of felony 
conviction should be affirmed. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this / ^ day of December, 2007. 
MARKL. SHURTLEFF 
Attorney GeneraL 
CHRISTINE F. SOLTIS 
Assistant Attorney General 
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§ 6 8 - 3 - 5 . Effect of repeal 
The repeal of a statute does not revive a statute previously repealed, or affect 
any right which has accrued, any duty imposed, any penalty incurred, or any 
action or proceeding commenced under or by virtue of the statute repealed. 
Codifications R.S. 1898, § 2492; C.L. 1907, § 2492; C.L. 1917, § 5842; R.S 1933, § 88-2-5; C. 
1943, § 88-2-5. 
(West Supp. 2007) 
§ 76-3-402. Conviction of lower degree of offense—Procedure and limitations 
(1) If at the time of sentencing the court, having regard to the nature and circumstances of 
the offense of which the defendant was found guilty and to the history and character of the 
defendant, and after having given any victims present at the sentencing and the prosecuting 
attorney an opportunity to be heard, concludes it would be unduly harsh to record the 
conviction as being for that degree of offense established by statute, the court may enter a 
judgment of conviction for the next lower degree of offense and impose sentence accordingly. 
(2) If the court suspends the execution of the sentence and places the defendant on 
probation, whether or not the defendant is committed to jail as a condition of probation, the 
court may enter a judgment of conviction for the next lower degree of offense: 
(a) after the defendant has been successfully discharged from probation; 
(b) upon motion and notice to the prosecuting attorney; 
(c) after reasonable effort has been made by the prosecuting attorney to provide notice 
to any victims; 
(d) after a hearing if requested by either party under Subsection (2)(c); and 
(e) if the court finds entering a judgment of conviction for the next lower degree of 
offense is in the interest of justice. 
(3)(a) An offense may be reduced only one degree under this section, whether the reduction 
is entered under Subsection (1) or (2), unless the prosecutor specifically agrees in writing or 
on the court record that the offense may be reduced two degrees. 
(b) In no case may an offense be reduced under this section by more than two degrees. 
(4) This section does not preclude any person from obtaining or being granted an 
expungement of his record as provided by law. 
(5) The court may not enter judgment for a conviction for a lower degree of offense if: 
(a) the reduction is specifically precluded by law; or 
(b) if any unpaid balance remains on court ordered restitution for the offense for which 
the reduction is sought. 
(6) When the court enters judgment for a lower degree of offense under this section, the 
actual title of the offense for which the reduction is made may not be altered. 
(7)(a) A person may not obtain a reduction under this section of a conviction that requires 
the person to register as a sex offender until the registration requirements under Section 
77-27-21.5 have expired. 
(b) A person required to register as a sex offender for the person's lifetime under 
Subsection 77-27-21.5(10)(c) may not be granted a reduction of the conviction for the 
offense or offenses that require the person to register as a sex offender. 
(8) As used in this section, "next lower degree of offense" includes an offense regarding 
which: 
(a) a statutory enhancement is charged in the information or indictment that would 
increase either the maximum or the minimum sentence; and 
(b) the court removes the statutory enhancement pursuant to this section. 
Laws 1973, c. 196, § 76-8-402; Laws 1983, c. 88, § 6; Laws 1991, c. 7, § 1, Laws 2006, c 50, § 1, eff. 
May 1, 2006; Laws 2006, c. 189, § 6, eff. July 1, 2006; Laws 2007, c. 103, § 1, eff. April 30, 2007. 
(West 2004) 
§ 7 6 - 1 0 - 1 2 0 1 . Definitions 
For the purpose of this part: 
(1) "Contemporary community standards' ' means those current standards in 
the vicinage where an offense alleged under this act has occurred, is occurring, 
or will occur. 
(2) "Distribute" means to transfer possession of materials whether with or 
without consideration. 
(3) "Exhibit" means to show. 
(4) "Harmful to minors" means that quality of any description or representa-
tion, in whatsoever form, of nudity, sexual conduct, sexual excitement, or 
sadomasochistic abuse when it: 
(a) taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest in sex of minors; 
(b) is patently offensive to prevailing standards in the adult community as 
a whole with respect to what is suitable material for minors; and 
(c) taken as a whole, does not have serious value for minors. Serious 
value includes only serious literary, artistic, political or scientific value for 
minors. 
(5) "Knowingly" means an awareness, whether actual or constructive, of the 
character of material or of a performance. A person has constructive knowl-
edge if a reasonable inspection or observation under the circumstances would 
have disclosed the nature of the subject matter and if a failure to inspect or 
observe is either for the purpose of avoiding the disclosure or is criminally 
negligent. 
(6) "Material" means anything printed or written or any picture, drawing, 
photograph, motion picture, or pictorial representation, or any statue or other 
figure, or any recording or transcription, or a&y mechanical, chemical, or 
electrical reproduction, or anything which is or may be used as a means of 
communication. Material includes undeveloped photographs, molds, printing 
plates, and other latent representational objects. 
(7) "Minor" means any person less than eighteen years of age. 
(8) "Nudity" means die showing of the human male or female genitals, pubic 
area, or buttocks, with less than an opaque covering, or the showing of a female 
breast with less than an opaque covering, or any portion thereof below the top 
of the nipple, or the depiction of covered male genitals in a discemibly turgid 
state. 
(9) "Performance" means any physical human bodily activity, whether en-
gaged in alone or with other persons, including but not limited to singing, 
speaking, dancing, acting, simulating, or pantomiming. 
(10) "Public place" includes a place to which admission is gained by pay-
ment of a membership or admission fee, however designated, notwithstanding 
its being designated a private club or by words of like import. 
(11) "Sado-masochistic abuse" means flagellation or torture by or upon a 
person who is nude or clad in undergarments, a mask, or in a revealing or 
bizarre costume, or the condition of being fettered, bound, or otherwise 
physically restrained on the part of one so clothed. 
(12) "Sexual conduct" means acts of masturbation, sexual intercourse, or 
any touching of a person's clothed or unclothed genitals, pubic area, buttocks, 
or, if the person is a female, breast, whether alone or between members of the 
same or opposite sex or between humans and animals in an act of apparent or 
actual sexual stimulation or gratification. 
(13) "Sexual excitement" means a condition of human male or female 
genitals when in a state of sexual stimulation or arousal, or the sensual 
experiences of humans engaging in or witnessing sexual conduct or nudity. 
Laws 1975, c. 49, § 3; Laws 1977, c. 92, § 3; Laws 2001, c. 9, § 116, eff. April 30, 
2001. 
(West Supp. 2007) 
§ 76-10-1201. Defini t ions 
For the purpose of this part: 
(1) "Blinder rack" means an opaque cover that covers the lower 2/3 of a material so that 
the lower 2/3 of the material is concealed from view. 
(2) "Contemporary community standards" means those current standards in the vicinage 
where an offense alleged under this part has occurred, is occurring, or will occur. 
(3) "Distribute" means to transfer possession of materials whether with or without consid-
eration. 
(4) "Exhibit" means to show. 
(5)(a) "Harmful to minors" means that quality of any description or representation, in 
whatsoever form, of nudity, sexual conduct, sexual excitement, or sadomasochistic abuse when 
it: 
(i) taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest in sex with minors; 
(ii) is patently offensive to prevailing standards in the adult community as a whole with 
respect to what is suitable material for minors; and 
(iii) taken as a whole, does not have serious value for minors, 
(b) Serious value includes only serious literary, artistic, political or scientific value for 
minors. 
(6) "Knowingly" means an awareness, whether actual or constructive, of the character of 
material or of a performance. A person has constructive knowledge if a reasonable inspection 
or observation under the circumstances would have disclosed the nature of the subject matter 
and if a failure to inspect or observe is either for the purpose of avoiding the disclosure or is 
criminally negligent as described in Section 76-2-103. 
(7) "Material" means anything printed or written or any picture, drawing, photograph, 
motion picture, or pictorial representation, or any statue or other figure, or any recording or / 
transcription, or any mechanical, chemical, or electrical reproduction, or anything which is or 
may be used as a means of communication. Material includes undeveloped photographs, 
molds, printing plates, and other latent representational objects. 
(8) "Minor" means any person less than 18 years of age. 
(9) "Negligently" means simple negligence, the failure to exercise that degree of care that 
a reasonable and prudent person would exercise under like or similar circumstances. 
(10) "Nudity" means: 
(a) the showing of the human male or female genitals, pubic area, or buttocks, with less 
than an opaque covering; 
(b) the showing of a female breast with less than an opaque covering, or any portion of 
the female breast below the top of the areola; or 
(c) the depiction of covered male genitals in a discernibly turgid state. 
(11) "Performance" means any physical human bodily activity, whether engaged in alone or 
with other persons, including singing, speaking, dancing, acting, simulating, or pantomiming. 
(12) "Public place" includes a place to which admission is gained by payment of a 
membership or admission fee, however designated, notwithstanding its being designated a 
private club or by words of like import. 
(13) "Sado-masochistic abuse" means: 
(a) flagellation or torture by or upon a person who is nude or clad in undergarments, a 
mask, or In a revealing or bizarre costume; or 
(b) the condition of being fettered, bound, or otherwise physically restrained on the part 
of a person clothed as described in Subsection (13)(a). 
(14) "Sexual conduct" means acts of masturbation, sexual intercourse, or any touching of a 
person's clothed or unclothed genitals, pubic area, buttocks, or, if the person is a female, 
breast, whether alone or between members of the same or opposite sex or between humans 
and animals in an act of apparent or actual sexual stimulation or gratification. 
(15) "Sexual excitement" means a condition of human male or female genitals when in a 
state of sexual stimulation or arousal, or the sensual experiences of humans engaging in or 
witnessing sexual conduct or nudity. 
Laws 1975, c. 49, § 3; Laws 1977, c. 92, § 3; Laws 2001, c. 9, § 116, eff April 30, 2001; Laws 2007, c. 
123, § 1, eff. April 30, 2007; Laws 2007, c. 337, § 2, eff. Mar. 19, 2007. 
(West 2004) 
§ 7 6 - 1 0 - 1 2 0 6 . Dealing in material harmful to a minor 
(1) A person is guilty of dealing in material harmful to minors when, 
knowing that a person is a minor, or having failed to exercise reasonable care 
in ascertaining the proper age of a minor, he: 
(a) intentionally distributes or offers to distribute, exhibits or offers to 
exhibit to a minor any material harmful to minors; 
(b) intentionally produces, presents, or directs any performance before a 
minor, that is harmful to minors; or 
(c) intentionally participates in any performance before a minor, that is 
harmful to minors. 
(2) Each separate offense under this section is a third degree felony punisha-
ble by a minimum mandatory fine of not less than $300 plus $10 for each 
article exhibited up to the maximum allowed by law and by incarceration, 
without suspension of sentence in any way, for a term of not less than 14 days. 
This section supersedes Section 77-18-1. 
(3) If a defendant has already been convicted once under this section, each 
separate further offense is a second degree felony punishable by a minimum 
mandatory fine of not less than $5,000 plus $10 for each article exhibited up to 
the maximum allowed by law and by incarceration, without suspension of 
sentence in any way, for a term of not less than one year. This section 
supersedes Section 77-18-1. 
Laws 1973, c. 196, § 76-10-1206; Laws 1975, c. 49, § 6; Laws 1989, c. 187, § 8; Laws 
1990, c. 163, §§ 10, 11; Laws 1997, c. 164, § 1, eff. May 5, 1997; Laws 2000, c. 53, § 1, 
eff. May 1, 2000. 
(West Supp. 2007) 
§ 76-10-1206. Dealing: in material harmful to a minor—Exemptions for Inter-
net sendee providers and hos t ing companies 
(1) A person is guilty of dealing in material harmful to minors when, knowing that a person 
is a minor, or having negligently failed to determine the proper age of a minor, the person: 
(a) intentionally distributes or offers to distribute, exhibits or offers to exhibit to a minor 
any material harmful to minors; 
(b) intentionally produces, presents, or directs any performance before a minor, that is 
harmful to minors; or 
(c) intentionally participates in any performance before a minor, that is harmful to 
minors. 
(2)(a) Each separate offense under this section is a third degree felony punishable by: 
(i) a minimum mandatory fine of not less than $1,000 plus $10 for each article 
exhibited up to the maximum allowed by law; and 
(ii) incarceration, without suspension of sentence, for a term of not less than 14 days. 
(b) This section supersedes Section 77-18-1. 
(3)(a) If a defendant has already been convicted once under this section, each separate 
further offense is a second degree felony punishable by: 
(i) a minimum mandatory fine of not less than $5,000 plus $10 for each article 
exhibited up to the maximum allowed by law; and 
(ii) incarceration, without suspension of sentence, for a term of not less than one year. 
(b) This section supersedes Section 77-18-1. 
(c)(i) This section does not apply to an Internet service provider, as defined in Section 
76-10-1230, if: 
(A) the distribution of pornographic material by the Internet service provider occurs 
only incidentally through the Internet service provider's function of: 
(I) transmitting or routing data from one person to another person; or 
(II) providing a connection between one person and another person; 
(B) the Internet service provider does not intentionally aid or abet in the distribu-
tion of the pornographic material; and 
(C) the Internet service provider does not knowingly^ receive funds from or through 
a person who distributes the pornographic material in* exchange for permitting the 
person to distribute the pornographic material. 
(ii) This section does not apply to a hosting company, as defined in Section 76-10-1230, 
if: 
(A) the distribution of pornographic material by the hosting company occurs only 
incidentally through the hosting company's function of providing data storage space or 
data caching to a person; 
(B) the hosting company does not intentionally engage, aid, or abet in the distribu-
tion of the pornographic material; and 
(C) the hosting company does not knowingly receive funds from or through a person 
who distributes the pornographic material in exchange for permitting the person to 
distribute, store, or cache the pornographic material. 
(4)(a) A service provider, as defined m Section 76-10-1230, is not negligent under this 
section if it complies with Section 76-10-1231. 
(b) A content provider, as defined in Section 76-10-1230, is not negligent under this 
section if it complies with Section 76-10-1233. 
Laws 1973, c. 196, § 76-10-1206; Laws 1975, c. 49, § 6; Laws 1989, c. 187, § 8; Laws 1990, c. 163, §§ 10, 
11; Laws 1997, c. 164, § 1, eff. May 5, 1997, Laws 2000, c. 53, § 1, eff. May 1, 2000; Laws 2005, c 281, 
§ 5, eff. March 21, 2005; Laws 2007, c. 337, § 5, eff. Mar 19, 2007. 
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1 I Mr. McCullough? 
2 I MR. MCCULLOUGH: I think the Court's aware of the 
3 situation, your Honor. Ir11 leave it to the Court. 
4 THE COURT: Okay. Well, in the first regard, the 
5 Court is going to recall the warrant that they've launched 
6 against Mr. Haltom, and I don't see any reason to interfere 
7 with his ability to reach whatever status or level that he can 
8 in Kansas. I'm not looking to be punitive for those reasons. 
9 Mr. Haltom has made all of his appearances. I have no 
10 doubt that he will make his appearances. I guess what we'll 
11 have to do is we'll set a date probably for sentencing, and 
12 then if he gets out of jail earlier in Kansas, we'll set 
13 some — I'll issue some order in regards to your notifying the 
14 Court. 
15 In regards to the 402 motion, Mr. McCullough, I 
16 understand your argument totally. I have no problem with 
17 Mr. Haltom selling whatever he wants to sell personally, as 
18 long as he does it within the law. I think a lot of judges are 
19 believers in the First Amendment, but when one pushes it, one 
20 deals with the repercussions of what happens when one wants to 
21 push that envelope to its ultimate. 
22 The legislature sets the laws in this State. I take 
23 an oath to follow the laws as passed by the legislature. This 
24 is one of those instances where they made the selling of 




























This Court does not feel that I am in a position to 
grant your 4 02 motion at this point. Mr. Haltom was convicted 
of a jury of this crime. The legislature set the penalty for 
this crime. Your argument is a compelling argument, but it 
deals a lot, I think, with mitigating circumstances for 
purposes of sentencing and not necessarily reduction to 402 — 
or 402 reduction. 
I have made it a policy on the bench that I will not 
restrict anybody from filing a 4 02 motion at the time that 
their probation is concluded. I would encourage you to do that 
at this particular — on this particular case, just requiring 
notification to the State so that they can make any objection 
that they feel is appropriate at that time, if they feel that 
an objection is appropriate. 
You know, as I say to you, Mr. Haltom is not — 
obviously this has nothing to do with this case because this 
video went to a minor, but in regards to the other activities 
that he conducts in his stores, it is not my standard, it is 
a community standard, and the Court has to honor what that 
community standard is, which is why it was set up that way, and 
our community has made its decisions. In regards to this case, 
it's really something totally — it really doesn't come down to 
that necessarily, because it dealt with an under age individual 



























So I'm going to deny your motion at this time and tell 
you to renew it at the time of the conclusion of his probation 
if the conviction isn't thrown out before then. You know, 
who knows, but obviously I get the chance to sentence 
Mr. Haltom before that occurs, and again, I would be happy to 
entertain your arguments. They're all mitigating circumstances 
in regards to punishment, and the Court obviously will take 
those all into consideration at the time that the sentence is 
imposed. But again, I'll deny your motion at this time. I 
will recall your warrant. 
We don't have next year's calendar yet, do we? 
COURT CLERK: If we just pick a Monday in January 
we'11 be okay. 
THE COURT: Monday, okay. Let's just — that would 
be — does anyone have January of 2 004? 
COURT CLERK: I'll get my book and then I can give you 
a date. 
THE COURT: Okay. Let's just give you a date in 
January of 2 0 04 for sentencing, with the understanding that if 
he's released earlier than that that you're under court order 
to notify this Court within 72 hours of his return to the State 
of Utah after his release from the Kansas authorities. 
MR. MCCULLOUGH: No problem. We'd put a full ad in 
the newspaper, your Honor, but we'll certainly notify the 
Court. 
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1 I COURT CLERK: We could go January the 12th. 
2 THE COURT: All right, January the 12th will be the 
3 tentative date set for sentencing. 
4 COURT CLERK: At 8:30. 
5 THE COURT: Okay? 
6 MR. MCCULLOUGH: Thank you, your Honor. 
7 THE COURT: All right, and we711 recall that warrant. 
8 Do you want findings prepared on today's hearing? I mean I 
9 think — I don't know. My initial reaction is there is nothing 
10 to appeal, it's totally within the Court's discretion, s o — 
11 MR. MCCULLOUGH: Well, it isn't totally within the 
12 Court's discretion. I certainly intend to add it to my appeal, 
13 but I think that the Court — I think there's an adequate 
14 record on the transcript. 
15 THE COURT: That's fine. Okay. 
16 MR. MCCULLOUGH: With due respect, your Honor, I have 
17 great respect for this Court, and am not threatening when I say 
18 appeal, but the Court is well aware of what my job is in this 
19 case. 
20 THE COURT: I do recall that Mr. Haltom has his 
21 rights. I would never expect to infringe upon those rights. I 
22 do not take it personally. It's only when they write silly 
23 things about me that I take it personally in the decision. Not 
24 yours. The court of appeals or the Supreme Court. 
25 MR. MCCULLOUGH: Okay. Good. Well, you can — yeah, 
-15-
you can have your feud with them and not me, your Honor. Thank 
you. 
THE COURT: You're welcome. 
{Hearing concluded) 
Addendum C 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, : MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER 
Plaintiff, : CASE NO. 001913808 
vs. : 
JOHN V. HALTOM, : Judge Randall N. Skanchy 
Defendant. : 
The Court has before it defendant John Hal torn' s (Mef endant") Motion 
and Memorandum in support of a reduction of the Judgment and Sentence to 
a lower category of offense, from a third degree felony to a Class A 
misdemeanor. The matter was fully briefed by the parties, the State 
objected thereto, and the matter was presented before the Court for oral 
argument on Monday, March 26, 2 007. 
Defendant was convicted in 2 0 03 of the crime of Distributing Harmful 
Material to a Minor, a third degree felony. On January 12, 2004, he was 
sentenced to 0 to 5 years at the Utah State Prison, which was suspended, 
and he was ordered probation for a period of 3 6 months, and to serve 3 0 
days in the Salt Lake County jail. Pursuant to Section 76-3-402 of the 
Utah Code Ann., defendant, at the termination of his probation, has 
requested this Court exercise its discretion to reduce his conviction one 
level, from a third degree felony to a Class A misdemeanor. Having 
reviewed the nature and circumstances of the offense and the history and 
STATE V. HALTOM PAGE 2 MEMORANDUM DECISION 
character of the defendant, the Court does not conclude that it is unduly 
harsh for his conviction to remain at the level of the degree of offense 
established by the statute and therefore denies the Motion. 
Dated this "^^ day of March, 2007. 
Addendum D 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, : DECISION AND ORDER 
Plaintiff, : CASE NO. 001913808 
V S . 2 
John Haltorn, : Judge Randall N. Skanchy 
Defendant. : 
Defendant John Haltom, by and through his counsel of record, W. 
Andrew McCullough, brought a Motion to Reduce Degree of Offense and 
Motion Strike Evidentiary Hearing. The State appeared by and through 
counsel, Lohra L. Miller and T. Langdon Fisher. 
Having reviewed the briefs and the supporting authority, the 
Court hereby grants the motion to Strike Evidentiary Hearing. The 
Court hereby denies the Motion to Reduce Degree of Offense pursuant to 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-402 (2002), it not being persuaded that the 
Legislative revisions to the definition of material "harmful to 
minors'' require a different result. This Court is therefore not 
inclined in its discretionary powers to reduce the degree of this 
offense. 
Dated this l^~ day of June, 2007. 
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Background: Defendant was convicted by jury in 
the Third District Court, Salt Lake Department, 
Dennis M. Fuchs, J., of dealing in material harmful 
to a minor, a third degree felony. Defendant 
appealed. 
Holdings: The Court of Appeals, Thorne, J., held 
that: 
(1) defendant failed to establish entrapment as a 
matter of law, and 
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Most Cited Cases 
(Formerly 92k268(5)) 
Materiality required to reverse a criminal conviction 
for destruction of evidence as a denial of due 
process is more than evidentiary materiality; 
evidence must be material in a constitutional sense. 
U.S.C.A. ConstAmend. 14. 
[4] Criminal Law 110 €==>1134(3) 
110 Criminal Law 
110XXIV Review 
110XXIV(L) Scope of Review in General 
1 lOkl 134 Scope and Extent in General 
HOkl 134(3) k. Questions Considered 
in General. Most Cited Cases 
Whether a statement is offered for the truth of the 
matter asserted is a question of law, which an 
appellate court reviews under a correction of error 
standard. Rules of Evid., Rule 801(c). 
[5] Criminal Law 110 €==>338(1) 
110 Criminal Law 
110XVII Evidence 
110XV1I(D) Facts in Issue and Relevance 
110k338 Relevancy in General 
110k338(l) k. In General. Most Cited 
Cases 
Criminal Law 110 €=^1153(1) 
110 Criminal Law 
110XXIV Review 
110XXIV(N) Discretion of Lower Court 
HOkl 153 Reception and Admissibility of 
Evidence; Witnesses 
HOkl 153(1) k. In General. Most Cited 
Cases 
While relevant evidence is generally admissible, a 
trial court has broad discretion to determine 
whether proffered evidence is relevant, and an 
appellate court will find error only if the trial court 
has abused its discretion. 
[6] Criminal Law 110 €^1144.13(2.1) 
110 Criminal Law 
© 2007 ThomsonAVest. No 
110XXIV Review 
110XXIV(M) Presumptions 
110k 1144 Facts or Proceedings Not 
Shown by Record 
110k 1144.13 Sufficiency of Evidence 
HOkl 144.13(2) Construction of 
Evidence 
HOkl 144.13(2.1) k. In General. 
Most Cited Cases 
When reviewing a claim of insufficiency of the 
evidence, the evidence and all reasonable inferences 
that may be drawn therefrom are viewed in the light 
most favorable to the jury verdict. 
[7] Criminal Law 110 €=^37(2.1) 
110 Criminal Law 
11011 Defenses in General 
110k36.5 Official Action, Inaction, 
Representation, Misconduct, or Bad Faith 
110k3 7 Entrapment 
110k3 7(2) What Constitutes 
Entrapment 
110k37(2.1) k. In General. Most 
Cited Cases 
State has never recognized a per se rule of 
entrapment; instead, state has adopted an objective 
standard through which all entrapment claims will 
be examined, with the focus on whether the police 
conduct created a substantial risk that a normal 
law-abiding person would be induced to commit a 
crime. 
[8] Criminal Law 110 €==>37(2.1) 
110 Criminal Law 
11 Oil Defenses in General 
110k36.5 Official Action, Inaction, 
Representation, Misconduct, or Bad Faith 
110k3 7 Entrapment 
110k3 7(2) What Constitutes 
Entrapment 
110k37(2.1) k. In General. Most 
Cited Cases 
To determine whether an entrapment has occurred 
fact finders are required to examine whether law 
officers, or their agents, induced the commission of 
an offense in order to obtain evidence by methods 
creating a substantial risk that the offense would be 
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committed by one not otherwise ready to commit it. 
[9] Criminal Law 110 €==>37(6.1) 
110 Criminal Law 
11011 Defenses in General 
110k36.5 Official Action, Inaction, 
Representation, Misconduct, or Bad Faith 
110k3 7 Entrapment 
110k37(6) Particular Cases and 
Offenses 
110k37(6.1) k. In General. Most 
Cited Cases 
Defendant, who was convicted in dealing in 
material harmful to a minor, failed to establish 
entrapment as a matter of law; although defendant 
argued that he would not have sold adult video to 
minor in absence of store employee's alleged 
relationship with police officer who sent minor into 
novelty store and who allegedly used employee as 
police agent to induce defendant to sell video to 
minor, evidence of employee's relationship with 
state was insufficient to establish entrapment, since 
defendant asked minor for her identification and 
examined it, and once he did this, there was no 
evidence that employee attempted to coerce 
defendant to ignore her date of birth. U.C.A.1953, 
76-10-1206(2004). 
[10] Criminal Law 110 €=>419(2) 
110 Criminal Law 
110XVII Evidence 
11 OXVII(N) Hearsay 
110k419 Hearsay in General 
110k419(2) k. Evidence as to Fact of 
Making Declarations and Not as to Subject-Matter. 
Most Cited Cases 
If an out-of-court statement is offered simply to 
prove that it was made, without regard to whether it 
was true, such testimony is not proscribed by the 
hearsay rule. Rules of Evid., Rule 801(c). 
[11] Criminal Law 110 €==>1134(3) 
110 Criminal Law 
110XXIV Review 
HOXXIV(L) Scope of Review in General 
1 lOkl 134 Scope and Extent in General 
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HOkl 134(3) k. Questions Considered 
in General. Most Cited Cases 
To the extent that there is no factual dispute, 
whether a statement is offered for the truth of the 
matter asserted is a question of law, which an 
appellate court reviews under a correction of error 
standard. Rules of Evid., Rule 801(c). 
[12] Criminal Law 110 €==>419(2) 
110 Criminal Law 
110XVII Evidence 
11 OXVII(N) Hearsay 
110k419 Hearsay in General 
110k419(2) k. Evidence as to Fact of 
Making Declarations and Not as to Subject-Matter. 
Most Cited Cases 
Trial court's suppression of portion of witness's 
testimony as inadmissible hearsay was improper in 
prosecution for dealing in material harmful to a 
minor, where statements were not offered for truth 
of matter asserted. Rules of Evid., Rule 801(c); 
U.C.A.1953, 76-10-1206 (2004). 
[13] Criminal Law 110 €=>H69.1(9) 
110 Criminal Law 
110XXIV Review 
110XXIV(Q) Harmless and Reversible Error 
1 lOkl 169 Admission of Evidence 
HOkl 169.1 In General 
HOkl 169.1(9) k. Hearsay. Most 
Cited Cases 
Trial court's error in suppressing portion of 
witness's testimony as inadmissible hearsay was 
harmless in prosecution in which defendant 
presented entrapment claim as defense to charge of 
dealing in material harmful to a minor; although 
trial court disallowed defendant's attempt to use 
own words of novelty store employee, who initially 
checked minor's identification when she entered 
store and permitted her to shop, to support 
defendant's assertion that employee knew store 
policy well enough to train others, defendant was 
able to present other evidence of employee's role as 
store's trainer. Rules of Evid., Rule 801(c); 
U.C.A.1953, 76-10-1206. 
[14] Criminal Law 110 €=>H65(1) 
Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works. 
121P.3d42 
121 P.3d 42, 532 Utah Adv. Rep. 9, 2005 UT App 348 
(Cite as: 121 P.3d 42) 
Page 4 
110 Criminal Law 
110XXIV Review 
110XXIV(Q) Harmless and Reversible Error 
1 lOkl 165 Prejudice to Defendant in 
General 
HOkl 165(1) k. In General. Most Cited 
Cases 
An appellate court does not upset a verdict of a jury 
merely because some error or irregularity may have 
occurred, but will do so only if it is something 
substantial and prejudicial in the sense that there is 
a reasonable likelihood that in its absence there 
would have been a different result. 
[15] Criminal Law 110 €=^1169.2(1) 
110 Criminal Law 
110XXIV Review 
110XXIV(Q) Harmless and Reversible Error 
HOkl 169 Admission of Evidence 
HOkl 169.2 Curing Error by Facts 
Established Otherwise 
llOkl 169.2(1) k. In General. Most 
Cited Cases 
Where evidence is excluded by a trial court and the 
substance of such evidence is later admitted through 
some other means, any error which may have 
resulted is cured. 
[16] Infants 211 €=^20 
211 Infants 
21 III Protection 
211k20 k. Criminal Prosecutions Under Laws 
for Protection of Children. Most Cited Cases 
Evidence of subsequent legislative changes to 
format of driver licenses for minors was irrelevant 
in prosecution for dealing in material harmful to a 
minor; defendant's defense was never predicated on 
claim that he was unfamiliar with format of state's 
driver licenses, or that he was confused by minor's 
identification in particular, and instead, defendant's 
defense centered entirely upon his reliance on 
novelty store's policy of precluding minors from 
premises, his expectation that his employees would 
not fail in enforcing the policy, and his claim that 
police used store employee to entrap defendant. 
Rules of Evid., Rule 401; U.C.A.1953, 76-10-1206. 
[17] Statutes 361 €=>181(1) 
361 Statutes 
361VI Construction and Operation 
361VI(A) General Rules of Construction 
361kl80 Intention of Legislature 
361kl81 In General 
361kl81(l) k. In General. Most 
Cited Cases 
Statutes 361 €=>184 
361 Statutes 
361VI Construction and Operation 
361VI(A) General Rules of Construction 
361kl80 Intention of Legislature 
36 Ik 184 k. Policy and Purpose of Act. 
Most Cited Cases 
Statutes 361 €==>188 
361 Statutes 
361VI Construction and Operation 
361VI(A) General Rules of Construction 
361kl87 Meaning of Language 
361kl88 k. In General. Most Cited 
Cases 
When interpreting statutes, an appellate court's 
primary goal is to evince the true intent and purpose 
of the Legislature; to discover that intent, the 
appellate court looks first to the plain language of 
the statute. 
[18] Statutes 361 €=>212.6 
361 Statutes 
361VI Construction and Operation 
361VI(A) General Rules of Construction 
361k212 Presumptions to Aid Construction 
361k212.6 k. Words Used. Most Cited 
Cases 
When examining statutory language, an appellate 
court assumes the legislature used each term 
advisedly and in accordance with its ordinary 
meaning. 
[19] Statutes 361 €==>189 
361 Statutes 
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361VI Construction and Operation 
361VI(A) General Rules of Construction 
361kl87 Meaning of Language 
361kl89 k. Literal and Grammatical 
Interpretation. Most Cited Cases 
Statutory words are read literally, unless such a 
reading is unreasonably confused or inoperable. 
[20] Statutes 361 €=>206 
361 Statutes 
361VI Construction and Operation 
361VI(A) General Rules of Construction 
361k204 Statute as a Whole, and Intrinsic 
Aids to Construction 
361k206 k. Giving Effect to Entire 
Statute. Most Cited Cases 
An appellate court avoids interpretations that will 
render portions of a statute superfluous or 
inoperative. 
[21] Infants 211 €=>20 
211 Infants 
21 III Protection 
211k20 k. Criminal Prosecutions Under Laws 
for Protection of Children. Most Cited Cases 
Sufficient evidence supported defendant's 
conviction for dealing in material harmful to a 
minor; defendant, a part-owner of novelty store who 
was convicted after he sold adult video to minor, 
held minor's license and examined it to ensure that 
it was authentic, and defendant read every line 
material to ensuring authenticity except date of 
birth, and thus, jury's decision that defendant's 
behavior did not constitute "reasonable care" was 
supported. U.C.A.1953, 76-10-1206. 
[22] Criminai Law 110 €=^1159.2(1) 
110 Criminal Law 
110XXIV Review 
HOXXIV(P) Verdicts 
HOkl 159 Conclusiveness of Verdict 
HOkl 159.2 Weight of Evidence in 
General 
HOkl 159.2(1) k. In General. Most 
Cited Cases 
In making the determination as to whether there is 
sufficient evidence to uphold a conviction, an 
appellate court does not sit as a second fact finder. 
[23] Criminal Law 110 €=^1144.13(2.1) 
110 Criminal Law 
110XXIV Review 
110XXIV(M) Presumptions 
1 lOkl 144 Facts or Proceedings Not 
Shown by Record 
HOkl 144.13 Sufficiency of Evidence 
1 lOkl 144.13(2) Construction of 
Evidence 
HOkl 144.13(2.1) k. In General. 
Most Cited Cases 
Criminal Law 110 €==>1144.13(5) 
110 Criminal Law 
110XXIV Review 
110XXIV(M) Presumptions 
110k 1144 Facts or Proceedings Not 
Shown by Record 
1 lOkl 144.13 Sufficiency of Evidence 
HOkl 144.13(5) k. Inferences or 
Deductions from Evidence. Most Cited Cases 
When reviewing a claim of insufficiency of the 
evidence, the evidence and all inferences that may 
be drawn therefrom are viewed in the light most 
favorable to the jury verdict. 
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Before Judges BILLINGS, BENCH, and THORNE. 
OPINION 
THORNE, Judge: 
| 1 John Vonderhaar Haltom appeals his 
conviction for dealing in material harmful to a 
minor, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah 
Code section 76-10-1206 (2000). We affirm. 
BACKGROUND 
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1f 2 On August 4, 2000, just a few days after Dr. 
John's Lingerie and Novelty store (Dr. John's) 
opened for business, police in Midvale, Utah, sent 
BP, a seventeen-year-old girl, into the store to 
attempt to buy an adult film. She entered the store 
and was soon thereafter approached by Vadim 
Saprgeuldiev (Vadim), who asked to see her 
identification. BP gave Vadim, who was an 
employee of Dr. John's but not actually on duty 
when BP entered, her driver license. He glanced at 
it and then gave it back and permitted her to shop. 
After wandering around the store for a few minutes, 
BP went to the adult video rack where she chose 
one at random and then went to the counter to make 
the purchase. As she shopped, Vadim called 
Haltom, a part owner of Dr. John's, to the counter 
and asked him how one could determine whether a 
license was authentic. Haltom informed Vadim 
that if BP attempted to purchase an adult video, he 
would show him. As BP approached the counter, 
Haltom asked her for her identification and she 
again produced her driver license. 
If 3 Haltom took the license and examined it. 
Among the relevant information contained on the 
license were BP's photo, name, address, social 
security number, and her date of birth, which clearly 
showed that BP was born in December 1982 and 
was therefore just seventeen years old at the time. 
Haltom carefully compared BP to the photo and 
then asked her to recite her social security 
number-printed next to her date of birth-and her 
address. When she gave an address with a street 
name rather than coordinates, Haltom became 
concerned and asked her to clarify her answer. She 
responded with the proper coordinate address, 
which corresponded with the address on the license, 
and Haltom handed back the license. Vadim then 
asked Haltom if he could sell the video to BP and 
Haltom answered "What's the problem? It's her 
I.D. [and] she's eighteen, right?" Vadim completed 
the sale as Haltom was talking with BP and she left 
the store. 
If 4 Soon thereafter, BP returned to the store with 
Detective Brimley, the Midvale City Police officer 
who had sent her into Dr. John's. Brimley 
informed Haltom that he had sold an adult video to 
a minor-BP-and BP identified Vadim and Haltom as 
the people she had dealt with during the transaction. 
Haltom was arrested for dealing with material 
harmful to a minor, in violation of Utah Code 
section 76-10-1206 (2000). 
1f 5 Prior to trial, Haltom petitioned to have the 
charges dismissed because, he argued, he had been 
entrapped as a matter of law. The State responded 
and a hearing was scheduled, during which Haltom 
presented just one witness-Curtis Gorman, a former 
employee who had been fired for stealing from 
Haltom and who had been referred to the Midvale 
Police Department by Haltom for that theft. 
Haltom argued that Brimley had established a 
relationship with Vadim, and that Brimley had used 
Vadim as a police agent to induce Haltom to sell the 
video to BP. Through Gorman's testimony, Haltom 
introduced evidence that Brimley was interested in 
subverting a Dr. John's employee, and that, at 
Brimley's urging, Gorman had *46 talked with 
Vadim about meeting with Brimley. But, Gorman 
never again met with Brimley and he had no idea 
whether Brimley had been able to talk with Vadim, 
or if, assuming such an encounter occurred, Vadim 
had agreed to work with Brimley. Consequently, 
the trial court denied Haltom's motion, but informed 
all parties that Haltom wrould be given the 
opportunity to present his entrapment claim to the 
jury as a factual defense to the charge. 
Tf 6 The case was subsequently tried in front of a 
jury, which convicted Haltom. Haltom filed a 
post-trial motion to arrest the judgment, which the 
trial court denied, and he was sentenced to a 
statutory term of imprisonment of zero to five years 
in prison. The trial court, however, suspended all 
but thirty days of that time and placed Haltom on 
probation. Haltom now appeals. 
ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW ™l 
FN1. Although on appeal Haltom argues 
that his due process rights were violated 
when Brimley erased the audio tape made 
during his interview with Gorman, he 
failed to preserve this argument below. 
See State v. Dean, 2004 UT 63, 1f 13, 95 
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P.3d 276 (stating "appellate courts will not 
consider an issue, including constitutional 
arguments, raised for the first time on 
appeal unless the trial court committed 
plain error or the case involves exceptional 
circumstances"); see also State v. Irwin, 
924 P.2d 5, 7-8 (Utah CtApp. 1996). Had 
Haltom preserved this issue "[t]he 
materiality required to reverse a criminal 
conviction for ... destruction of evidence as 
a denial of due process is more than 
evidentiary materiality." State v. Nebeker, 
657 P.2d 1359, 1363 (Utah 1983). "The 
evidence must be material in a 
constitutional sense." State v. Humphrey, 
793 P.2d 918, 926 (Utah Ct.App.1990). 
To meet this threshold, Haltom must show 
that the " 'evidence is vital to the issues of 
whether [he] is guilty of the charge and 
whether there is a fundamental unfairness 
that requires the Court to set aside [his] 
conviction.' "Id. (quoting State v. Lovato, 
702 P.2d 101, 106 (Utah 1985)). Haltom 
does not meaningfully assert that anything 
on the destroyed tape satisfies this burden, 
and in fact, Gorman's version of the taped 
interview largely agreed with Brimley's 
version. Thus, it is questionable whether 
Haltom would have been able to 
demonstrate harm resulting from the 
destruction of the tape. Nevertheless, 
because he failed to preserve this issue in 
the trial court, we will not address the 
substance of the argument here. 
[1][2][3] 1f 7 Haltom argues that the trial court 
erred in concluding that he had not been entrapped 
as a matter of law. The trial court's decision 
presents a mixed question of fact and law. See 
State v. Beddoes, 890 P.2d 1, 3 (Utah Ct.App.1995) 
Although we review factual findings for clear 
error and legal conclusions for correctness, due to 
the factually sensitive nature of entrapment cases 
we will affirm the trial court's decision "unless we 
can hold, based on the given facts, that reasonable 
minds cannot differ as to whether entrapment 
occurred." Id. Only when reasonable minds could 
not differ can we find entrapment as a matter of law. 
See id. 
[4] \ 8 Haltom next argues that the trial court erred 
in concluding that certain testimony was 
inadmissible hearsay. "Whether a statement is 
offered for the truth of the matter asserted is a 
question of law, which we review under a correction 
of error standard." State v. Perez, 924 P.2d 1, 2-3 
(Utah CtApp. 1996). 
[5] If 9 Haltom also argues that the trial court's 
decision on the relevance of certain statutory 
changes to the format of minors' driver licenses was 
incorrect. "While relevant evidence is generally 
admissible, a trial court has broad discretion to 
determine whether proffered evidence is relevant, 
and we will find error ... only if the trial court has 
abused its discretion." State v. Harrison, 805 P.2d 
769, 780 (Utah CtApp. 1991) (citation omitted). 
[6] \ 10 Finally, Haltom argues that the evidence 
was insufficient to support his conviction both as a 
matter of law and of fact. Haltom's argument falls 
into two categories. First, he asserts that his 
activities did not constitute a violation of section 
76-10-1206 as a matter of law, which under these 
circumstances presents a question of statutory 
interpretation that we review for correctness. See 
State v. Bluff, 2002 UT 66, K 37, 52 P.3d 1210. 
Second, he asserts that the evidence was not 
sufficient to support the jury's verdict. "[W]hen 
reviewing a claim of insufficiency of the evidence, 
the evidence and all reasonable inferences that may 
be drawn therefrom are viewed in the light most 
favorable to the jury verdict." State v. Warden, 813 
P.2dll46, 1150 (Utah 1991). 
*47 ANALYSIS 
[7] [8] f 11 Haltom first argues that the trial court 
erred in failing to dismiss the complaint because he 
was entrapped as a matter of law. "Utah has never 
recognized a per se rule of entrapment." State v. 
Beddoes, 890 P.2d 1, 3 (Utah CtApp. 1995). 
Instead, Utah has adopted an objective standard 
through which all entrapment claims will be 
examined, with the focus on whether the police 
conduct created "a substantial risk that a normal 
law-abiding person would be induced to commit a 
crime." State v. Martinez, 848 P.2d 702, 706 (Utah 
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Ct.App.1993); see also State v. Taylor, 599 P.2d 
496, 500 (Utah 1979) (stating that the objective 
view asks whether "the conduct of the government 
comport[s] with a fair and honorable administration 
of justice"). Under an objective standard, law 
enforcement officials are not denied the use of 
decoys. See Taylor, 599 P.2d at 500. Nor are 
police prohibited from using people that a 
defendant might consider to be a friend. See 
Martinez, 848 P.2d at 707 (stating "the mere 
existence of a personal relationship does not 
establish entrapment"). Instead, the focus of our 
objective test is on examining whether the 
government conduct created or manufactured a 
crime. See Taylor, 599 P.2d at 500-01 ("Nothing 
can be more reprehensible than to induce the 
commission of crime for the purpose of 
apprehending and convicting the perpetrator." 
(quotations and citation omitted)). Consequently, 
to determine whether an entrapment has occurred 
fact finders are required to examine whether law 
officers, or their agents, induced "the commission 
of an offense in order to obtain evidence ... by 
methods creating a substantial risk that the offense 
would be committed by one not otherwise ready to 
commit it." Beddoes, 890 P.2d at 3 (alteration in 
original) (quotations and citations omitted). 
[9] 1f 12 Haltom argues that he would not have 
sold an adult video to a minor in the absence of 
Vadim's alleged relationship with Brimley. 
However, at best, the evidence Haltom offered in 
support of this assertion is subject to multiple 
interpretations, ranging from the one offered by 
Haltom-that Vadim became an agent of the State-to 
the one offered by the State-that Vadim did nothing 
to assist Brimley's crusade against Dr. John's. 
Moreover, had the evidence of Vadim's relationship 
with the State been less tenuous, this alone is still 
insufficient to establish entrapment as a matter of 
law. See id. (noting that exploitation of a 
relationship is a necessary factor to meet the 
requirements of entrapment). This is especially 
true given Haltom's decision to ask BP for her 
identification and examine it. Once he did this, 
there is no evidence that Vadim attempted to coerce 
or convince Haltom to ignore her date of birth, or 
that Vadim told Haltom that he had already checked 
the birthdate and that there was no need to do so 
© 2007 Thomson/West. No 
again. Rather than an issue that could be settled as 
a matter of law, Haltom presented the trial court 
with evidence that could have supported Haltom's 
entrapment defense, but that also could have been 
interpreted as insignificant. Consequently, because 
reasonable minds easily could differ on the question 
of entrapment as a matter of law in this case, the 
trial court properly denied Haltom's motion.™2 
See id. 
FN2. Haltom presents no challenge to the 
jury's refusal to accept his entrapment 
defense as a matter of fact. 
[10][11] 1f 13 Haltom next argues that the trial 
court erred in suppressing a portion of Theresa 
Ferrone's testimony as inadmissible hearsay. Rule 
801(c) of the Utah Rules of Evidence defines 
hearsay as "a statement, other than one made by the 
declarant ..., offered in evidence to prove the truth 
of the matter asserted." Utah R. Evid. 801(c). " ' 
[I]f an out-of-court statement is "offered simply to 
prove that it was made, without regard to whether it 
was true, such testimony is not proscribed by the 
hearsay rule." ' "In re G.Y., 962 P.2d 78, 84 (Utah 
Ct.App.1998) (quoting State v. Olsen, 860 P.2d 
332, 335 (Utah 1993)). "To the extent that there is 
no factual dispute, whether a statement is offered 
for the truth of the matter asserted is a question of 
law, which we review under a correction of error 
standard." Id. (quotations, citation, and alteration 
omitted). 
*48 [12][13] H 14 Haltom argues that the trial 
court erred in concluding that he was offering 
Ferrone's testimony concerning a conversation with 
Vadim for the truth of the matter asserted. 
Specifically, Haltom suggests that Ferrone's 
testimony was offered to bolster Haltom's claim that 
Vadim was an expert in the store's policies and 
accepted methods for identifying and excluding 
minors from the premises. Assuming that Haltom's 
version of the testimony is correct, we do not 
believe that the statements were offered for the truth 
of the matter asserted.FN3 In fact, the excluded 
statement would have done nothing more than 
support Haltom's claim that Vadim was the store 
trainer and that he was quite aware of the store 
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policy concerning the admission of minors. 
FN3. During her direct examination, 
Ferrone was asked if Vadim had provided 
her with any instruction or training in 
addition to that provided by Haltom. She 
responded "Vadim just told me, you know, 
you need to check every I.D ...." at which 
point the State objected. The court 
sustained the objection. The State offered 
no reason for its objection, but the court 
informed Haltom that "[a]ny hearsay is off. 
[14][15] If 15 However, the trial court's erroneous 
exclusion of Vadim's statements does not 
necessarily require the reversal of Haltom's 
conviction. " '[W]e do not upset the verdict of a 
jury merely because some error or irregularity may 
have occurred, but will do so only if it is something 
substantial and prejudicial in the sense that there is 
a reasonable likelihood that in its absence there 
would have been a different result.' "State v. 
Hutchison, 655 P.2d 635, 636 (Utah 1982) (quoting 
State v. Urias, 609 P.2d 1326, 1329 (Utah 1980)). " 
Where evidence is excluded by the trial court and 
the substance of such evidence is later admitted 
through some other means, any error which may 
have resulted is cured." State v. Colwell, 2000 UT 
8, \ 29, 994 P.2d 177. Here, although the trial 
court disallowed Haltom's attempt to use Vadim's 
own words to support Haltom's assertion that 
Vadim knew the store policy well enough to train 
others, Haltom was able to present other evidence 
of Vadim's role as Dr. John's trainer. For instance, 
Haltom's long-time employee Bonnie Bolton 
testified that she was trained by Vadim on how to " 
card" potential patrons to ensure that they were not 
minors. During Haltom's testimony, he identified 
Vadim as "a senior employee," one sufficiently 
experienced to appear in the background of a Dr. 
John's promotional video carding potential 
customers. He further testified that he brought 
Vadim in from Nebraska to train the Utah 
employees and that Vadim was a trusted employee. 
Thus, although the jury was not presented with 
Vadim's statements, ample evidence of Vadim's 
knowledge was presented to the jury through other 
avenues. Thus, even though the trial court erred in 
suppressing the statement, the error was not 
harmful. See, e.g., State v. Blubaugh, 904 P.2d 
688, 697-98 (Utah Ct.App.1995) (concluding that 
trial court's error was harmless because sufficient 
similar evidence was presented to the jury to render 
the error harmless). 
[16] H 16 Haltom also argues that the trial court 
erred in denying his attempt to introduce subsequent 
legislative changes to the format of driver licenses 
for minors. "While relevant evidence is generally 
admissible, a trial court has broad discretion to 
determine whether proffered evidence is relevant, 
and we will find error in a relevancy ruling only if 
the trial court has abused its discretion." State v. 
Harrison, 805 P.2d 769, 780 (Utah CtApp.1991) 
(citation omitted). " 'Relevant evidence' means 
evidence having any tendency to make the existence 
of any fact that is of consequence to the 
determination of the action more probable or less 
probable than it would be without the evidence." 
Utah R. Evid. 401; see also Colwell, 2000 UT 8 at 
1127, 994 P.2d 177. 
^ 17 The trial court in this instance did not exceed 
the permitted range of its discretion. Haltom's 
defense was never predicated on a claim that he was 
unfamiliar with the format of Utah's driver licenses, 
or that he was confused by BP's identification in 
particular. Instead, his defense centered entirely 
upon his reliance on Dr. John's policy of precluding 
minors from the premises, his expectation that his 
employees would not fail in enforcing the policy, 
and his claim that the Midvale police used Vadim to 
entrap Haltom. The subsequent legislative changes 
to the *49 driver license format were irrelevant to 
the defenses offered by Haltom, and therefore we 
conclude that the trial court acted well within its 
permitted range of discretion in refusing to allow 
Haltom to introduce evidence of the changes. 
f 18 Haltom's final and most forceful argument is 
that the evidence was insufficient as a matter of law 
to convict him of dealing in materials harmful to a 
minor. More concisely, Haltom asserts that the 
State failed to prove that he violated the statute 
when he sold the video to BP. To address Haltom's 
challenge properly, we must first determine the 
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culpable mental state required to violate section 
76-10-1206. Only after doing so can we examine 
the merits of his argument. 
[17][18][19][20] U 19Section 76-10-1206 states: 
A person is guilty of dealing in material harmful to 
minors when, knowing that a person is a minor, or 
having failed to exercise reasonable care in 
ascertaining the proper age of a minor, he: 
(a) intentionally distributes or offers to distribute; 
exhibits or offers to exhibit to a minor any material 
harmful to minors. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1206(1) (2003) (emphasis 
added). "When interpreting statutes, our primary 
goal is to evince the true intent and purpose of the 
Legislature." State v. Martinez, 2002 UT 80, \ 8, 
52 P.3d 1276 (quotations and citations omitted). " 
To discover that intent, we look first to the plain 
language of the statute." State v. Bluff, 2002 UT 
66, \ 34, 52 P.3d 1210 (quotations and citation 
omitted). "When examining the statutory language 
we assume the legislature used each term advisedly 
and in accordance with its ordinary meaning." 
Martinez, 2002 UT 80 at If 8, 52 P.3d 1276. " 
[T]hus, the statutory words are read literally, unless 
such a reading is unreasonably confused or 
inoperable." Bluff 2002 UT 66 at 1f 34, 52 P.3d 
1210 (quotations and citation omitted). " 
Furthermore, we 'avoid interpretations that will 
render portions of a statute superfluous or 
inoperative.' "Martinez, 2002 UT 80 at If 8 
(quoting Hall v. State Dep't of Corr., 2001 UT 34, 
1fl5,24P.3d958). 
[21] ^ 20 At issue in the instant case is the 
meaning of the phrase "having failed to exercise 
reasonable care in ascertaining the proper age." 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1206(1) (emphasis added). 
FN4 "Reasonable care" is defined as "[t]hat degree 
of care which a person of ordinary prudence would 
exercise in the same or similar circumstances, [and 
f]ailure to exercise such care is ordinary negligence. 
" Black's Law Dictionary 1265 (6th ed.1990). 
Haltom has presented us with no reason to believe 
that the legislature intended a different meaning, or 
with any case law that would support his position in 
the face of this language. Compare State v. 
Hamblin, 616 P.2d 376, 378-79 (Utah 1983) 
(concluding that the legislature's use of the term " 
negligence" warranted a conclusion that the 
elements of automobile homicide were met if the 
state could show that the defendant had been simply 
negligence, and not criminally negligent), with State 
v. Larsen, 2000 UT App 106, \ 17-18, 999 P.2d 
1252 (noting that the legislature intended criminal 
negligence to be the applicable mens rea for 
negligent homicide when it used the term "criminal 
negligence" in the statute). Although section 
76-12-1206 uses neither of the terms "simple 
negligence" or "ordinary negligence," it does 
contain the phrase "reasonable care." "Reasonable 
care" carries with it a commonly accepted 
definition, and thus, we are bound by its meaning. 
Consequently, we conclude that a person violates 
section 76-10-1206 if they act with simple or 
ordinary negligence in failing to discover that the 
recipient of "harmful material" is a minor, prior to 
providing the material. 
FN4. The statute also creates liability for 
selling "harmful material" to someone the 
seller knows to be a minor. SeeUtah Code 
Ann. § 76-10-1206(1) (2003). However, 
Haltom is not, and has never been, accused 
of actually knowing that BP was a minor at 
the time of the sale. Accordingly, we limit 
our analysis to Haltom's failure to 
determine BP's age and whether that 
failure violated the statute. 
[22][23] \ 21 Having determined the simple 
negligence is sufficient to violate section 
76-10-1206, we turn our attention to examining 
whether the evidence here was sufficient *50 to 
support Haltom's conviction.FN5 "In making the 
determination as to whether there is sufficient 
evidence to uphold a conviction, an appellate court 
does not sit as a second fact finder." State v. 
Warden, 813 P.2d 1146, 1150 (Utah 1991). " 
[W]hen reviewing a claim of insufficiency of the 
evidence, the evidence and all inferences that may 
be drawn therefrom are viewed in the light most 
favorable to the jury verdict." Id. 
FN5. Although Haltom's conviction was 
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based on the jury's finding that he was 
reckless when he sold the video, this error 
is not fatal to his conviction. See State v. 
Perez, 924 P.2d 1, 3 (Utah Ct.App.1996) (" 
[W]e may not interfere with a jury verdict 
unless upon review of the entire record, 
there emerges error of sufficient gravity to 
indicate that a defendant's rights were 
prejudiced in a substantial manner." 
(quotations and citation omitted)). The 
trial court's instruction forced the State to 
meet a higher mens rea standard than 
required under the statute, and because the 
principles underlying "simple negligence" 
are incorporated within the definition of 
recklessness, the jury must have, by 
necessity, found Haltom also to be 
negligent when they determined that he 
had been reckless. Q£Utah Code Ann. § 
76-2-104 (2003). Therefore, although the 
trial court erred in instructing the jury, the 
error could not have prejudiced Haltom 
and was thus harmless. 
Tf 22 The jury was presented with evidence that BP 
entered Dr. John's, that she selected an adult video, 
and that she took it to the counter. There, Haltom 
asked her for her identification after Vadim called 
him over and asked him to demonstrate how to 
confirm the authenticity of a person's identification. 
BP gave Haltom her driver license, and Haltom 
compared the picture on the license to BP. Satisfied 
that the picture was indeed of BP, he asked her to 
confirm virtually every piece of material 
information on the license, including her address 
and social security number, but oddly not her date 
of birth. BP answered all of his questions, but 
Haltom became suspicious when the address she 
provided did not match the street address on the 
license. However, when questioned further, she 
provided an equivalent coordinate address that was 
identical to the one on the license. Satisfied that 
the identification was hers, Haltom instructed 
Vadim to sell BP the video. 
| 23 Examining all of these facts, and the 
inferences that can be drawn from them, in a light 
most favorable to the jury's verdict, we conclude 
that, as a factual matter, the evidence was sufficient. 
Haltom held the license and examined it to ensure 
that it was authentic. He read every line material to 
ensuring the authenticity except the date of birth. 
Thus we cannot say that the jury's decision that 
Haltom's behavior did not constitute "reasonable 
care" is unsupported. 
\ 24 Haltom responds that the defense he 
presented eliminated any possible negligence 
finding as a matter of law. We disagree. At trial 
Haltom argued that it was, and is, Dr. John's policy 
to exclude from the store everyone under the age of 
eighteen. Under the policy, every patron's 
identification was checked at the door, so he argues 
that it was reasonable for him to assume that she 
was over eighteen when she reached the counter. 
The State countered that in the few days that the 
store was operating in Midvale before Haltom's 
arrest, the officer who eventually arrested Haltom 
had twice entered the store without being subjected 
to the "mandatory" identification check. The State 
also pointed to BP's presence in the store as 
evidence that Dr. John's policy was at best 
sporadically enforced. Thus, the jury was 
presented with conflicting information concerning 
Dr. John's policy, and it was left to determine 
whether the policy alone amounted to "[t]hat degree 
of care which a person of ordinary prudence would 
exercise in the same or similar circumstances." 
Black's Law Dictionary 1265 (6th ed.1990). 
*§ 25 Even accepting Haltom's argument that a 
policy could be used to immunize him from 
prosecution-which is a position we do not 
necessarily accept-the evidence concerning the 
application of this policy was conflicting. 
Consequently, it was the role of the jury to 
determine whether the policy, and Haltom's claimed 
reliance upon it, amounted to the reasonable care 
required by section 76-10-1206. Cf. Little Am. Ref. 
Co. v. Leyba, 641 P.2d 112, 114 (Utah 1982) ("The 
jury is entrusted to resolve all relevant questions of 
fact presented to the court. The questions of fact 
include findings of negligencef.]"). The jury 
determined that Haltom had been *51 reckless, and 
by implication that he had violated section 
76-10-1206' s duty of reasonable care, when he sold 
the video to BP. Consequently, we conclude that 
Haltom's conviction was supported by sufficient 
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evidence. 
CONCLUSION 
If 26 The trial court properly denied Haltom's 
motion to dismiss the charges because Haltom 
failed to show that he had been entrapped as a 
matter of law. The court erred in denying Haltom 
the opportunity to introduce testimony concerning 
Vadim's out of court statements, but Haltom was 
given the opportunity to present evidence to the jury 
that was sufficiently similar to the excluded 
testimony rendering the trial court's error harmless. 
Finally, a showing of simple negligence is sufficient 
to support a conviction under section 76-10-1206's 
expectation of "reasonable care." The jury found 
that Haltom failed to use reasonable care in selling 
an adult video to BP and the evidence supports its 
verdict. 
Tf 27 Accordingly, we affirm Haltom's conviction. 
1f 28 WE CONCUR: JUDITH M. BILLINGS, 
Presiding Judge and RUSSELL W. BENCH, 
Associate Presiding Judge. 
Utah App.,2005. 
State v. Haltom 
121 P.3d 42, 532 Utah Adv. Rep. 9, 2005 UT App 
348 
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On Certiorari to the Utah Court of Appeals 
NEHRING, Justice: 
INTRODUCTION 
f 1 John Haltom was convicted of dealing in 
material harmful to a minor, a third degree felony 
under Utah Code section 76-10-1206 (2000),FN1 
and appealed his case to the court of appeals. Utah 
Code section 76-10-1206 renders criminal the sale 
of harmful material to a minor if the person making 
the sale afail[s] to exercise reasonable care in 
ascertaining the proper age of a minor." The court 
of appeals interpreted "reasonable care" to be 
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synonymous with ordinary negligence and 
concluded that the trial record contained adequate 
evidence of Mr. Haltom's negligence to affirm his 
conviction. We granted certiorari to consider 
whether the court of appeals was correct when it 
evaluated Mr. Haltom's conduct against the standard 
of ordinary negligence. We hold that the court of 
appeals was correct and affirm. 
FN1. After the defendant was charged in 
2000, the statute was amended to read that 
a violation occurs when a defendant acts 
recklessly or negligently in failing to 
ascertain the age of a minor-buyer before 
intentionally distributing material harmful 
to him or her. Utah Code Ann. § 
76-10-1206 (2003 & Supp.2005). All 
citations to section 76-10-1206 in this 
opinion refer to the statute in effect in the 
year 2000 when Mr. Haltom was charged. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW AND 
BACKGROUND 
[1] If 2 The issue we take up today presents a pure 
question of law. We therefore review the decision 
of the court of appeals for correctness. We need 
not dwell on the facts that the jury considered in 
convicting Mr. Haltom. By providing a brief 
summary of the circumstances that led to Mr. 
Haltom's felony conviction, we merely provide 
context for our legal analysis and offer fair warning 
that law enforcement officials, at least those in the 
city of Midvale, are apt to display considerable zeal 
in enforcing statutes that regulate the operation of 
sexually oriented businesses and the sale of their 
products. 
Tf 3 Mr. Haltom is a co-owner of Dr. John's 
Lingerie and Novelty Store. From the day it 
opened, Dr. John's was not seen as a welcome 
addition to Midvale's commercial community, and 
the offended citizens of Midvale complained to the 
police department about the store's wares. The 
department sent a thirty-year-old detective to the 
store who twice bought adult-only videos without 
being asked to verify his age. Based on his 
experience with the purchases, the detective 
believed that the store would sell merchandise to a 
minor. To advance his theory, the detective 
solicited minors to test Dr. John's age verification 
protocols. The store first turned away a 
seventeen-year-old boy at its door, but Dr. John's 
failed its second test. 
If 4 Brittany was seventeen years old when she 
entered Dr. John's on August 4, 2000. She would 
turn eighteen on December 12, 2000. An employee 
approached Brittany when she entered the store and 
asked for her identification. She presented her 
driver's license. The employee "glanced" at it but 
permitted her to remain in the store. After touring 
the premises for several minutes, Brittany selected 
the video "Getting Wet, the Last Howl." The 
video's status as material *794 harmful to a minor 
was not disputed. SeeUtah Code Ann. § 
76-10-1201(4), (6) (2003) (defining "harmful" and " 
material"). Brittany brought the video to the 
counter where Mr. Haltom was standing and sought 
to purchase it. Mr. Haltom asked Brittany for her 
identification, and she again produced her driver's 
license. Mr. Haltom compared Brittany's features 
with the photograph on the license and asked her to 
repeat her social security number. He asked her for 
her address and questioned her closely about it 
because Brittany first gave Mr. Haltom a street 
name instead of the directional coordinate number 
listed on her license. The sale of the video and Mr. 
Haltom's arrest followed. 
If 5 The jury that convicted Mr. Haltom was 
instructed that he could not be found guilty unless 
he acted recklessly when he failed to accurately 
ascertain Brittany's age. At the court of appeals, 
Mr. Haltom claimed that, based on his own conduct 
and his assumptions about the age verification 
measures undertaken by the employee who 
confronted Brittany when she entered the store, the 
evidence fell short of establishing his recklessness. 
The State countered that the trial court erred when it 
instructed the jury that recklessness was the 
requisite mental state for the crime. The State 
argued that section 76-10-1206's "reasonable care" 
language made ordinary negligence the standard to 
establish culpability for the crime of dealing in 
material harmful to minors. The court of appeals 
agreed and found sufficient evidence of Mr. 
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Haltom's negligence in the record to affirm his 
conviction. We granted certiorari to review 
whether the court of appeals correctly concluded 
that Mr. Haltom's ordinary negligence could result 
in his conviction of this third degree felony. We 
hold that the court of appeals was correct. 
ANALYSIS 
[2] [^ 6 According to Mr. Haltom, the State cannot 
brand a person a felon for an act of ordinary 
negligence. So presented, Mr. Haltom's challenge 
does not ask us to resolve an ambiguity in section 
76-10-1206. He concedes that an act of ordinary 
negligence may breach section 76-10-1206's 
affirmative duty to use "reasonable care" to 
authenticate the age of prospective purchasers of 
harmful material. This case, then, is not about 
whether the plain language of section 76-10-1206 
communicates an intention to punish negligent 
conduct as a crime, because it clearly does. Rather, 
it is about whether, despite the statute's plain 
language, section 76-10-1206 must be interpreted to 
require a degree of culpability beyond ordinary 
negligence. 
\ 1 Mr. Haltom proposes three reasons why 
section 76-10-1206 cannot mean what it says; we 
find none to be persuasive. First, Mr. Haltom 
contends that Utah law governing criminal mental 
states generally forecloses bringing ordinary 
negligence, as opposed to criminal negligence, 
within its scope. Utah Code section 76-2-101, 
however, allows the Legislature to specify a mental 
state that is different from the most commonly used 
ones like knowing, reckless, or criminal negligence. 
Specifically, section 76-2-101 states that a person 
has not committed an offense unless (1) the conduct 
is prohibited by law and (2) the person "acts 
intentionally, knowingly, recklessly, with criminal 
negligence, or with a mental state otherwise 
specified in the statute defining the offense, as the 
definition of the offense requires" (emphasis 
added). The Legislature exercised this power 
legitimately when it inserted the "reasonable care" 
standard into the text of section 76-10-1206. 
[3] \ 8 Drawing on language from the Utah Court 
of Appeals' opinions, Mr. Haltom next contends that 
the ordinary negligence standard is limited to civil 
cases. He leans heavily on the statement made in 
State v. Larsen that " '[ordinary negligence, which 
is the basis for a civil action for damages, is not 
sufficient to constitute criminal negligence.' " 
2000 UT App 106, 1f 18, 999 P.2d 1252 (quoting 
State v. Standiford, 769 P.2d 254, 267 (Utah 1988) 
). We need not forswear the accuracy of this 
statement to reject Mr. Haltom's invocation of it. 
Ordinary negligence and criminal negligence are 
not the same. This is not to say that only criminal 
negligence may lead to criminal sanctions. 
Ordinary negligence is, of course, the basis for *795 
civil damage actions. Its domain is not, however, 
bounded to civil actions. 
If 9 Finally, Mr. Haltom attempts to stiffen his 
arguments with an appeal to constitutional law. 
Although his brief contains no direct citation to 
either the United States Constitution or the Utah 
Constitution, Mr. Haltom contends that United 
States Supreme Court precedent "surely supportfs] 
the contention that, in the area of distribution of 
non-obscene and constitutionally protected adult 
materials, mere negligence in distributing to a minor 
is not a constitutionally sound standard." Mr. 
Haltom looks to United States v. X-Citement Video, 
Inc., 513 U.S. 64, 115 S.Ct. 464, 130 L.Ed.2d 372 
(1994), as the case most supportive of this 
contention. There, the Supreme Court read a 
scienter requirement into a section of the Protection 
of Children Against Sexual Exploitation Act of 
1977. On its face, the text of the act would have 
permitted the conviction of persons who sold [in 
interstate commerce] visual depictions of minors 
engaged in explicit sexual conduct without regard to 
whether the defendant could reasonably discover 
the age of the persons depicted. Id. at 69, 115 S.Ct. 
464. The Supreme Court found it appropriate to 
fill the scienter gap with the "knowing" mental state 
that Congress assigned to other provisions of the 
act. Id at 78, 115 S.Ct 464. The Supreme Court, 
however, did not go so far as to infer that holding a 
defendant criminally accountable for distributing 
adult materials to a minor through "mere negligence 
" would offend the United States Constitution. 
Indeed, the Court's statements suggest the opposite. 
It noted that little or no mens rea might be 
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necessary to justify proscribing conduct in which " 
the perpetrator confronts the underage victim 
personally and may reasonably be required to 
ascertain the victim's age." Id at 72 n. 2, 115 S.Ct. 
464.This describes precisely the encounter between 
Mr. Haltom and Brittany. In short, the United 
States Supreme Court has imposed no constitutional 
impediment to making merely negligent conduct 
criminal, and neither do we. Accordingly, we 
affirm the court of appeals. 
If 10 Chief Justice DURHAM, Associate Chief 
Justice WILKINS, Justice DURRANT, and Justice 
PARRISH concur in Justice NEHRING's opinion. 
Utah,2007. 
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